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INTRODUCTION 
1. An introduction to the main concepts and  
to the aims of this dissertation 
1.1. What are personal and cultural values? 
Human values differ both within and between cultural groups (Rokeach, 1973), 
whilst the nation is seen as the key unit of shared basic values (Minkov & 
Hofstede, 2012). This matches with Williams’ (1970) conception of cultural 
values as shared ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society. 
Values emphasized in a given nation have become the most central feature of 
understanding culture, as researchers hold them responsible for shaping and 
justifying the particular beliefs, attitudes, goals, and actions of individuals and 
groups. Put another way, everyday practices as well as institutional 
arrangements and policies appear to express the underlying cultural value 
emphases of a society (Schwartz, 2004). 
Values, however, are also individual-level phenomena expressing and being 
expressed by people’s feelings and thoughts. Most importantly, personal values 
were also found relating to corresponding clusters of behavior throughout a 
variety of contexts (see Schwartz, 2005, for a review). From the psychological 
perspective, personal values are seen as beliefs about “desirable, transsituational 
goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” 
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001, p. 269). Although distinct from other psychological 
constructs (Schwartz, 1992), values were found to be systematically related to 
personality traits (Fischer & Boer, 2013), motives (Bilsky, 2006), individual 
religiosity (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), and attitudes (Boer & 
Fischer, 2013), for instance.  
When speaking about values, this dissertation mostly complies with the 
theory of human values by Shalom Schwartz (1992; 1994; 2006), who first 
identified ten distinct types of personal values – Universalism, Benevolence, 
Tradition, Conformity, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, 
and Self-Direction – at the individual level1, and later, seven cultural values at 
the level of nations (see Table 1). However, this dissertation also deals with the 
question of how Schwartz’s value theory relates to another prominent value 
theory by Ronald Inglehart (Studies I and II, see part 3 of this introduction). 
 
                                                 
1 In their refined theory, Schwartz and colleagues (2012) use 19 narrow defined value 
types. 
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Table 1. The Schwartz’s Ten Individual and Seven Culture-Level Value Types 
Individual-level Value Type and its 
Motivational Defining Goal 
Country-level Value Type and Societies’ 
Response to the Basic Problems in 
Regulating Human Activity 
Self-Transcendence Harmony-Egalitarianism 
Universalism: understanding, 
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature. 
Harmony emphasizes fitting into the 
world as it is, trying to understand and 
appreciate rather than to change, direct, or 
to exploit. 
Benevolence: preserving and enhancing 
the welfare of those with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’). 
Egalitarianism seeks to induce people to 
recognize one another as moral equals 
who share basic interests as human 
beings. 
Conservation Embeddedness 
Conformity: restraint of actions, 
inclinations, and impulses likely to upset 
or harm others and violate social 
expectations or norms. 
Embeddedness: people are viewed as 
entities embedded in the collectivity. 
 
Tradition: respect, commitment, and 
acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
one’s culture or religion provides. 
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of 
society, of relationships, and of self. 
Self-Enhancement Hierarchy-Mastery 
Power: social status and prestige, control 
or dominance over people and resources. 
Hierarchy relies on hierarchical systems 
of ascribed roles to ensure responsible, 
productive behavior. 
Achievement: personal success through 
demonstrating competence according to 
social standards. 
Mastery encourages active self-assertion 
in order to master, direct, and change the 
natural and social environment to attain 
group or personal goals. 
Openness Autonomy 
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and 
challenge in life. 
Affective Autonomy encourages 
individuals to pursue affectively positive 
experiences for themselves. 
Hedonism: pleasure or sensuous 
gratification for oneself. 
Intellectual Autonomy encourages 
individuals to pursue their own ideas and 
intellectual directions independently. 
Self-Direction: independent thought and 
action – choosing, creating, exploring. 
 
Note. Adapted from Schwartz (2006, pp. 140–141;1992, pp. 5–12). 
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According to Shalom Schwartz, the abovementioned value types form a quasi-
circular structure at both levels, as defined by the commonalities and conflicts 
among them (Figure 1). In other words, adjacent value types are jointly 
preferred; values on the respective opposite side of the circle are disliked. To 
give an example, Self-Direction values can serve to permit excitement (Stimu-
lation) or to discover and understand people who are different from oneself 
(Universalism). On the contrary, it causes cognitive (and sometimes social) 
conflicts to seek pleasure for oneself (Hedonism) and at the same time give 
family the first priority (Tradition) (Schwartz, 1992). 
Cultural values (Schwartz, 2006) are organized on three higher-order 
dimensions, based on the argument that values represent how groups respond to 
three vital societal issues: the relationship between the individual and the group 
(Embeddedness opposed to Intellectual and Affective Autonomy); how societies 
are structured so that people behave in a responsible manner, preserving the 
social fabric (Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism); and the relationship of humankind 
to the natural and social world (Mastery vs. Harmony).  
Human values represent a motivational continuum, just like the wheel of 
colors, rather than being discrete (Schwartz et al., 2012); therefore, it is possible 
to collapse them into two dimensions (Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lipsanen, & 
Helkama, 2009; Study I). The Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence 
dimension reflects whether people strive for sharing and fairness or whether 
they value competition and personal gain, even at the expense of others, 
whereas the Openness to Change vs. Conservation dimension contrasts novelty 
and expression of intellectual, behavioral, and emotional autonomy with 
communal-tied preferences for self-restriction and order. Further, although the 
individual-level structure has ten values as compared to seven value types at the 
cultural level, culture-level values “…are organized into the same two basic 
dimensions that organize individual-level values” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 101). 
Schwartz (2005) reviewed and empirically underpinned the link between 
values and demographic characteristics like education, gender, and age, which 
holds across a variety of countries. From a cross-cultural point of view, an 
important issue is the similarity of value structures across countries. This 
similarity, called structural invariance, is a precondition for conducting 
comparative research because, otherwise, the measures in question do not have 
the same meaning for all respondents (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; 
Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Human values are supposed to fulfill this 
requirement “because they are grounded in one or more of three universal 
requirements of human existence”, namely, “needs of individuals as biological 
organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare 
needs of groups” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 4).  
3 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 1. Schwartz’s prototypical value structures at the (a) country and (b) individual 
levels. Note. Adopted from Schwartz (1992, 2006). At the country level, a recently 
identified value type – Self-Fulfilled Connectedness – was added (Vauclair, Hanke, 
Fischer, & Fontaine, 2011). At the individual level, the labels of the diagonal axes were 
added – Growth vs. Protection and Personal vs. Social Focus (Fontaine, et al., 2008). 
 
 
Recent research (e.g., Davidov, 2008; Perrinjaquet, Furrer, Usunier, Cestre, & 
Valette-Florence, 2007; Steinmetz, Isidor, & Baeuerle, 2012) demonstrated that 
some samples do not fit the proposed quasi-circular structure, but there is also 
strong support in the literature for the contention that values are structured in 
similar ways across cultures (Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz, 2011; Fontaine, 
Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz, 1992). The functions of 
 11 
values might vary nevertheless along with important economic, contextual and 
historical factors (Fischer, Milfont, & Gouveia, 2011; Strack & Dobewall, 
2012). 
 
1.2. What is subjective well-being and why is it important? 
Early research in happiness established well-being as an important value for 
most people. “If happiness be one of the major goals of living, if not the only 
consciously acceptable end of life itself /…/, surely an analysis of the conditions 
fostering or hindering its attainment is an intellectual obligation of the first 
order, since upon it rests the merit of all other human and social values” 
(Hartmann, 1934, p. 203). A vast amount of work, therefore, has tried to find 
out what factors enhance people’s happiness and sense of well-being (Seligman, 
Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005, for a review).  
 
 
Figure 2. The components of subjective well-being (SWB). 
 
 
In recent decades, much of researchers’ attention has focused on the construct of 
subjective well-being (SWB), which, according to Diener and colleagues 
(2003), is simply the scientific name for how people evaluate lives, and equates 
to what lay people call satisfaction or happiness.2 Diener (1984) proposed that 
SWB has three components or facets such as life satisfaction, positive 
emotionality, and (lack of) negative emotionality, but the exact structure of 
SWB is still an object of debate (Busseri & Sadava, 2011). Figure 2 describes 
the structure of SWB in a simplified model, which does not assume any causal 
relationships between the components. 
During the last years, interest in societies’ performance on SWB indicators 
has risen among the public as well as in academia (Forgeard, Jayawickreme, 
Kern, & Seligman, 2011; Michaelson, Abdallah, Steuer, Thompson, & Marks, 
                                                 
2 Following this definition of SWB, the three terms —SWB, life satisfaction, and 
happiness— are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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2009). Indicators of life satisfaction or SWB are used to comprehend classical 
measures of societal success like the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World 
Bank, 1978–2013) or the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990–2011). 
National levels of SWB are today a well-studied topic and country rankings on 
happiness and life satisfaction scales (e.g., Diener & Oishi, 2004; Inglehart, 
Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008; Veenhoven, 1996) receive wide media coverage 
whenever published. On maps of world happiness (White, 2007), North 
America and Australia generally rank high, followed by Europe and South 
America, while Asian and African countries show relatively low average levels 
of SWB. There is also variation within these regions; for example, whilst 
Northern European welfare states often take a leading position in cross-national 
comparisons, Eastern European countries score much lower on SWB measures 
due to their distinct political past3 (Inglehart, et al., 2008; Study III). 
At the cultural level, individualism vs. collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; see 
Study I, for a discussion of the relationship between different measures of this 
dimension) and GDP, as well as democracy and perceived free choice, all relate 
to high SWB scores of nations (Diener et al., 2003). Fischer and Boer (2011) 
were further able to show that autonomy is even more important for national 
well-being than affluence. Therefore, it is not surprising that many researchers 
and, especially, policy makers believe that happiness and life satisfaction are 
better indicators of the quality of people’s lives and societal success than an 
increase in GDP is (Aldrick, 2009; Karma, 2008).  
Concentrating on individuals, there are several known determinants of SWB. 
Demographic variables like marital status or religiosity and other individual 
attributes of a person, like optimism or personality traits, have consistently been 
found to relate to SWB, while associations with other socio-demographic 
variables, like gender or age (Study III), tend to depend on the well-being 
measure used or the culture studied (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). SWB 
has gained importance because happiness not only relates to a variety of 
positive outcomes, such as good health and a long life, for instance, but also 
because it leads to individual success (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). 
However, there is increasing evidence that SWB is heritable. As shown by 
Weiss and colleagues (2008), genes account, on average, for about half of the 
variation in individuals’ level of happiness. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For some countries it was documented that what followed the fall of communism – 
radical social and economic reforms, economic hardships, insecurity, etc. – caused de-
clining life satisfaction, making it most unlikely that some fixed cultural predisposition 
of Eastern Europeans accounts for these level differences.  
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1.3. Personality traits, values, and SWB 
According to the Five Factor Theory (McCrae & Costa, 1990) of personality, 
personality traits are enduring tendencies to behave, think, and feel in consistent 
ways. The five factors (domains) – Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to 
Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness – are measured by 30 more 
specific personality facets and their structure replicates well across countries 
(McCrae et al., 2004). Of the basic personality traits, Extraversion and 
Neuroticism exert substantial influence on the affective and also, to a lesser 
degree, the cognitive component of SWB (Diener et al., 1999). Previous studies 
(see DeNeve, & Cooper, 1998 for a review) additionally identified a wide range 
of narrower personality variables theoretically related to the Big Five factors of 
personality, such as dominance sociability or warmth, to name a few, that 
correlate with happiness. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Haslam and colleagues (2009) found 
Schwartz’s values to be less strongly correlated with various measures of SWB 
as compared to the Big Five personality traits, whilst the latter even accounted 
for (i.e., mediated) the effects of values on SWB. The authors pointed out that 
values, nevertheless, have important “indirect associations with SWB through 
their interactions with other psychological and social variables” (Haslam, 
Whelan, & Bastian, 2009, p. 42). As mentioned above, previous research on 
well-being has shown that personality traits explain “a substantial amount of 
interindividual variance in SWB. However, these studies are limited in their 
ability to explain the underlying processes of SWB” (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & 
Lucas, 1999, pp. 164-165). Longitudinal value change, however, was found to 
be able to account for positive change in psychological well-being (Sheldon, 
2005). In the same vein, a recent longitudinal study (Headey, Muffels, & 
Wagner, 2010) showed that long-term happiness can be substantially affected by 
personal (and economic) choices, indicating that SWB is not solely dependent 
on one’s so-called set-point of happiness. Therefore, in addition to the genetic or 
dispositional component of SWB, there remains a lot of room for change across 
the life-span as well as for other factors to influence people’s SWB, including 
situational factors, other psychological constructs, etc. (Lucas, 2007).  
There is a general consensus about how values link to SWB, which can be 
summarized to three main perspectives: healthy vs. unhealthy values (uni-
versally leading to or undermining well-being, respectively), goal attainment 
(all values endorsed by a person can influence SWB independent of their 
motivational underpinning), and a congruence perspective (in which the fit 
between personal values and the values prevailing in the environment is seen as 
crucial to SWB) (see Sagiv, Roccas, & Hazan, 2004, for a review). Empirically, 
measures of SWB as well as “ill-being” (e.g., depression) are, indeed, located 
very centrally in the value space (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). Moreover, the 
values which have a negative (or positive) effect on SWB seem to vary across 
cultures dependent on a nation’s contextual characteristics (Sortheix & 
Lönnqvist, in press).  
4 
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1.4. Aims of the thesis 
The current doctoral thesis examines values and SWB from three perspectives: 
The first research question (see part 3 of this introduction) is how the set of 
value dimensions proposed by Shalom Schwartz (1992; 2006) relates to a 
conceptually and methodologically different set of value dimensions proposed 
by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), both at the individual and 
cultural levels (Study I and Study II). An answer to this research question will 
allow us to state the maximum amount of overlap between Schwartz’s and 
Inglehart’s value dimensions. Further, I examine if their items form common 
dimensions or whether they capture unique values content. At the cultural level, 
the results can be compared to earlier studies (e.g., Schwartz, 2006; Inglehart & 
Oyserman, 2004), whilst at the individual level, research (e.g., Beckers, Siegers, 
& Kuntz. 2012, Datler, Jagodzinski, & Schmidt, 2013; Welzel, 2010; Wilson, 
2005) has only started to understand the similarities and differences between 
Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s value theories. 
The second aim of this thesis is to examine change in life satisfaction across 
the life-span (Study III/part 4 of this introduction) in geographically and 
culturally close, yet politically and economically different Northern European 
countries – Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden. The main research question is 
whether or not, and to what extent, life satisfaction follows similar age trends 
across the four abovementioned countries. 
The third research question of the thesis asks how life satisfaction and 
happiness (Study IV) as well as values (Study V) are perceived from the self- 
and observer-perspective (i.e., based on ratings of informants who know the 
target well) in relation to personality traits (see part 5 of this introduction). More 
specifically, the aim is to clarify if the degree of self-other agreement in SWB is 
partially based on self- and other-rated personality facet scores; and whether the 
self-other agreement in personal values is at a comparable level with basic 
personality traits. This agreement, then, shows whether observers can judge 
other people’s values with some accuracy. 
 
 
2. Methods  
2.1. Samples 
2.1.1. International comparative surveys 
One of the oldest available cross-national datasets is the European Values Study 
(EVS). Since its start in 1981, the EVS (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) 
investigates changes in how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, 
politics, and society. Surveys are conducted every 9 years; Study III used the 
first three waves. In 1990, the EVS was integrated into the World Values Survey 
(WVS). The WVS (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) is carried out in an effort to 
compare values and attitudes of people living around the world. So far, five 
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waves have been conducted on all six inhabited continents and cover nations 
that represent more than 80% of the world’s population. Study III compares 
EVS/WVS data (1982 to 2008–2009) from Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and 
Sweden, while Studies I and II used WVS data (N = 46,444) collected in no 
less than 47 nations (with Germany split into East and West) in the years 2005 
to 2008. 
Data from the first four rounds (2002-2008) of the biannual European Social 
Survey (ESS) were used. The ESS (www.europeansocialsurvey.org) was 
designed to observe the interaction between Europe’s changing institutions and 
the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of its inhabitants. From the full sample, 
which includes over 30 nations, the same four nations were selected for Study 
III (total N = 39,420). 
 
2.1.2. Samples drawn from the Estonian population  
Study IV analyzed data (N = 1,251) collected by the Estonian Genome Center, 
University of Tartu (www.geenivaramu.ee) (see Allik, Realo, Mõttus, Esko, 
Pullat, & Metspalu, 2010). Participants were recruited (after random selection) 
from individuals visiting general practitioners’ offices and hospitals. They 
donated blood samples and completed a medical questionnaire; additionally, 
participants were asked to report their SWB and to complete a personality test. 
Informant reports were collected from acquaintances, friends, and family 
members who knew the target well. 
Study V was based on self- and other-reports from two relatively small 
samples with Ns of about 100. The participants reported demographic infor-
mation, their personal values, and personality traits. Well-acquainted informants 
provided other-ratings on the same instruments. 
  
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Schwartz’s values 
The original Schwartz Values Survey (SVS; 1992) uses importance ratings to 
assess people’s guiding principles in life (e.g., “mature love”) (used in Study 
II). The instrument consists of 56 items of which 45 are used to compare 
nations (Schwartz, 1994).  
The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, 
Burgess, & Harris, 2001), developed later, is especially suitable for represen-
tative and cross-national samples because it measures values in a less abstract 
way: indirectly through a comparison task with a fictive person’s goals, 
aspirations, and wishes. Respondents had to decide how much the described 
person was like them (self-rated form) or like the target (informant form) using 
the 21-item shortened version of the PVQ that is included in the core 
questionnaire of the ESS (used in Study V). The ESS PVQ has relatively low 
internal consistency coefficients due to the small number of items used to 
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measure each scale and their intentional heterogeneity (i.e., resulting in a low 
average inter-correlation among the items), ranging from .36 to .70 for the ten 
specific value types and from .69 to .75 for the higher-order values (Schwartz, 
2007).  
Studies I and II were based on a 10-item version of the PVQ as assessed in 
the fifth wave of the WVS. Table 2 lists the portraits of the both PVQ 
instruments in their exact wording. A comparison of the PVQs used in the ESS 
and the WVS indicates that one item for each value type might not fully capture 
all varieties of a segment of the value circle and that the WVS instrument has, in 
some cases, strongly diverging wording (e.g., the Benevolence item). For 
instance, the selected Universalism item captures only the concern for nature 
component of the Universalism value, omitting the two other components 
(understanding and social concern). Cronbach alphas of the four higher-order 
values, calculated on the basis of the pooled sample, were very low, ranging 
from .38 (Openness to Change) to .51 (Conservation). 
Study V also administered the Estonian Value Inventory (EVI; Aavik & 
Allik, 2002), which is a culture-specific value measure (i.e., a native language-
based set of value-laden nouns) referring to the same 2-dimensional structure 
like the Schwartz’s value measures described above, but including a value 
factor – Self-Realization – not captured in Schwartz’s theory. The other EVI 
factors were labeled as follows: Benevolence (parallel to Schwartz’s Bene-
volence/Tradition), Self-Enhancement (Power/Achievement), Broadmindedness 
(Universalism), Hedonism (Hedonism/Stimulation), and Conservatism 
(Conformity/Security). Alphas of the six EVI scales were in the range of .78 and 
.86 (Aavik & Allik, 2002). For the observer reports, the value questions were 
changed accordingly. 
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Table 2. A Comparison of the Portrait Value Questionnaires: European Social Survey 
versus the World Values Survey 
ESS PVQ with 21 items WVS PVQ with 10 items 
Universalism 
He/She thinks it is important that every person in 
the world be treated equally. He/She believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
 
It is important to him/her to listen to people who 
are different from him/her. Even when he/she 
disagrees with them, he/she still wants to 
understand them. 
 
He/She strongly believes that people should care 
for nature. Looking after the environment is 
important to him/her. 
Looking after the environment is 
important to this person; to care for 
nature. 
Benevolence 
It is very important to him/her to help the people 
around him/her. He/She wants to care for their 
well-being. 
It is important to this person to help 
the people nearby; to care for their 
well-being. 
It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her 
friends. He/She wants to devote him-/herself to 
people close to him/her. 
 
Conformity 
He/She believes that people should do what 
they’re told. He/She thinks people should follow 
rules at all times, even when no one is watching.  
 
It is important to him/her always to behave 
properly. He/She wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong. 
It is important to this person to 
always behave properly; to avoid 
doing anything people would say is 
wrong. 
Tradition 
It is important to him/her to be humble and 
modest. He/She tries not to draw attention to 
him-/herself.  
 
Tradition is important to him/her. He/she tries to 
follow the customs handed down by his/her 
religion or his/her family. 
Tradition is important to this person; 
to follow the customs handed down 
by one’s religion or family. 
Security 
It is important to him/her to live in secure 
surroundings. He/She avoids anything that might 
endanger his safety. 
Living in secure surroundings is 
important to this person; to avoid 
anything that might be dangerous.  
It is important to him/her that the government 
insures his/her safety against all threats. He/She 
wants the state to be strong so it can defend its 
citizens. 
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Table 2. Continues 
ESS PVQ with 21 items WVS PVQ with 10 items 
Power 
It is important to him/her to be rich. He/She 
wants to have a lot of money and expensive 
things. 
It is important to this person to 
be rich; to have a lot of money 
and expensive things. 
It is important to him/her to get respect from 
others. He/She wants people to do what 
he/she says. 
 
Achievement 
It is important to him/her to show his/her 
abilities. He/She wants people to admire 
what he/she does.  
 
Being very successful is important to 
him/her. He/She hopes people will recognize 
his/her achievements. 
Being very successful is impor-
tant to this person; to have people 
recognize one’s achievements. 
Stimulation 
He/She likes surprises and is always looking 
for new things to do. He/She thinks it is impor-
tant to do lots of different things in life.  
 
He/She looks for adventures and likes to take 
risks. He/She wants to have an exciting life. 
Adventure and taking risks are 
important to this person; to have 
an exciting life. 
Hedonism 
Having a good time is important to him/her. 
He/She likes to ‘spoil’ him-/herself. 
It is important to this person to 
have a good time; to “spoil” 
oneself.  
He/She seeks every chance he/she can to 
have fun. It is important to him/her to do 
things that give him/her pleasure. 
 
Self-Direction 
Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to him/her. He/She likes to do 
things in his/her own original way. 
It is important to this person to 
think up new ideas and be crea-
tive; to do things one’s own way. 
It is important to him/her to make his/her 
own decisions about what he/she does. 
He/she likes to be free to plan and not 
depend on others.  
 
Note: PVQ = Portrait Value Questionnaire; ESS = European Social Survey; WVS = World Values 
Survey. 
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2.2.2. Inglehart’s values 
Inglehart (1997) initially used factor scores based on 22 variables to derive the 
two cultural level dimensions of the Cultural Map of the World. Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) reduced them to the ten variables listed in Table 3. Inglehart and 
colleagues (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) therefore 
measure values as being reflected in people’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.4 
The same variables were used for individual level analyses to produce a similar 
2-dimensional value structure (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
 
Table 3. The Ten Items for Inglehart’s Dimensions 
Secular-rational values vs. Traditional authority 
1. How important is God in your life? [‘not at all’ 1 … ‘very important’ 10] 
2. Abortion is never justifiable [‘never justifiable’ 1 … ‘always justifiable’ 10] 
3. How proud are you to be (nationality)? [‘very proud’ 1 … ‘not proud at all’ 4] 
4. Showing greater respect for authority is [‘good thing’ 1 … ‘bad thing’ 3] 
5. It is more important for a child to learn independence and determination than 
obedience and religious faith (i.e. Autonomy index) [ -2 to +2] 
Self-expression vs. Survival values 
1. Taking all things together, would you say you are [‘very happy’ 1 … ‘not happy at 
all’ 4] 
2. Signing a petition [‘have done’ 1 ‘Might do’ 2, ‘would never do’ 3] 
3. Homosexuality is never justifiable [‘never justifiable’ 1 … ‘always justifiable’ 10] 
4. General trust in people. [‘Most people can be trusted 1’, ‘Can’t be too careful’ 2] 
5. Respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality of life over economic and 
physical security (i.e. Materialism – Postmaterialism index) [‘materialist’ 1, 
‘mixed’ 2, ‘postmaterialist’ 3]. 
 
 
2.2.3. Happiness and life satisfaction 
In this dissertation, two single items of happiness and life satisfaction, 
employing slightly different wording, were used (see, Studies III and IV, for a 
detailed discussion of their validity and reliability). The exact wording of the 
SWB items is presented in Table 4.  
In Study III, the single item life satisfaction measures included in the EVS, 
WVS, and the ESS were analyzed. The items in the WVS/EVS and ESS have 
almost identical phrasing. Unfortunately, the questions assess life satisfaction 
with a different number of scale points. Therefore, in Study III, the 11-point 
scale from the ESS was adjusted to the 10-point scale from the WVS. The 
                                                 
4 According to Schwartz's definition of values, these items would not belong to the 
domain of values as they do not represent motivational goals. 
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SWB-measure was then cross-validated against the ICS2001 dataset (Kuppens, 
Realo, & Diener, 2008), the latter using the multi-item Satisfaction With Life 
Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).  
Study IV assessed a person’s happiness and life satisfaction in a self-rated 
and an other-rated form with single item measures.  
 
Table 4. SWB Measures Used in this Dissertation 
Self-Ratings Other-Ratings 
Study III  
Life-satisfaction (EVS/ WVS): All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole these days? 
 
Life-satisfaction (ESS): All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole nowadays? 
 
Study IV 
Life-satisfaction: All things considered, 
how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole nowadays? 
Life-satisfaction: All things considered, 
how satisfied is she/he with her/his life as 
a whole nowadays? 
Happiness: Taking all things together, 
how happy would you say you are? 
Happiness: Taking all things together, 
how happy would you say she/he is? 
Note. EVS = European Values Survey; WVS = World Values Survey; ESS = European Social 
Survey. For the happiness item used in the WVS, please see Table 3. 
 
 
2.2.4. Basic personality traits 
Study IV measured personality traits with the Estonian version of the NEO 
Personality Inventory-3 (NEO-PI-3; McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005). The 
NEO-PI-3 measures the basic five personality domains and also the more 
specific 30 personality trait facet scores, being assessed with 240 balanced 
items. Internal consistencies of this inventory are commonly good, being above 
.87 for the domains and ranging from .48 to .84 for the facet scores (McCrae et 
al., 2005). 
In Study V, another measure of personality traits was used – the ‘Short Five’ 
personality inventory (S5; Konstabel, Lönnqvist, Walkowitz, Konstabel, & 
Verkasalo, 2012) – assessed with few (60) yet relatively long and comprehen-
sive items. Alphas of the Big Five personality traits of the S5 range from .74 to 
.89 (Konstabel et al., 2012). 
The NEO-PI-3 and the S5 were administered to the participants and infor-
mants in a self-report or an observer-report form, respectively. 
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3. The relationship between Schwartz’s and  
Inglehart’s value theories 
Research has identified several basic cultural (value) dimensions on which 
nations differ. Some cultural theories differentiate between as few as two (Bond 
et al., 2004; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), five (Hofstede, 2001), seven (Schwartz, 
2006), or no less than nine dimensions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & 
Gupta, 2003). As already said above, the specific interest of the current thesis is 
the comparison of value dimensions and value theories by Shalom Schwartz 
(e.g., 1992; 2006) and Ronald Inglehart (e.g., Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The ten most highly cited publications of these two 
authors alone, according to Google Scholar (as at 5 May 2013), account 
cumulatively for more than 46,000 citations, indicating their significant 
influence on contemporary social sciences and a remarkable acceptance of their 
theories. The meaning and measurement of values, however, differs from one 
theory to the other.  
According to Inglehart (1997), economic development is linked with 
coherent, and, to some extent, predictable changes across a wide range of 
political, social, and religious norms and beliefs. Inglehart’s value orientations 
reflect the basic life experiences of people, formed at an early age, which 
provide guidelines to master life in a given society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
The two dimensions spanning the Cultural Map of the World explain a large 
part of cross-cultural variation (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). 
Two conceptual differences between Inglehart’s and Schwartz’s value 
theories are most noteworthy. Firstly, Inglehart views values and their mani-
festations as indistinguishable. Problems emerge when correlating his 
dimensions with other constructs such as SWB, for instance, of which some 
elements, namely happiness, are already included in one of the Inglehart’s 
dimensions (see e.g., Kuppens et al., 2008; Datler, Jagodzinski, & Schmidt, 
2013, for a similar argument). Schwartz defines values more narrowly and, 
therefore, his cultural values can be related to any culture-level indicator of 
behavior or attitudes, including the average level of happiness and life-
satisfaction.  
Secondly, these two approaches can be considered to be conceptually 
different, as Schwartz’s theory focuses more on values as an aspect of people’s 
personality (cf. Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994), whereas Inglehart’s approach 
focuses more on underlying institutional processes (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005). 
Despite these differences, there is strong agreement among comparative 
social scientists that, at the cultural level, Schwartz’s Autonomy vs. 
Embeddedness and Inglehart’s Self-Expression vs. Survival value dimensions 
draw on the same cultural emphases of a society: autonomous human choice 
(Inglehart & Oyserman, 2004). This dimension on which cultures differ is most 
widely known as the opposition between individualism and collectivism 
6
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(Hofstede, 2001). However, the correlational pattern of Schwartz’s other 
cultural value types and Inglehart’s two dimensions was inconclusive, ranging 
from r = -.41 to .73 (Schwartz, 2006). If correlations leave space for 
speculations and two instruments have, without a doubt, several conceptual 
similarities (discussed in Study II), it is theoretically possible that they measure 
basically the same spectrum of a psychological construct, but that the alignment 
of the dimensions defining this spectrum might be different (Schmitt et al., 
2007).  
Even though more and more studies have been published on this topic over 
the past few years (Beckers, Siegers, & Kuntz. 2012, Datler, Jagodzinski, & 
Schmidt, 2013; Welzel, 2010; Wilson, 2005), there is still less known about the 
relationship between Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s value dimensions at the 
individual level. Recently, Beckers, Siegers, and Kuntz (2012) compared 
Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s indicators. After studying the links between these 
values and several dependent variables, they concluded that Schwartz’s values 
are a more powerful instrument than Inglehart’s dimensions. Datler and 
colleagues (2012) assessed the validity of Inglehart’s and Schwartz’s value 
dimensions using representative West German data (WVS/ESS). Both value 
theories were able to predict a large part of the variation in specific attitudes and 
behavior, but, contrary to Beckers and colleagues’ (2012) interpretation, they 
found Inglehart’s dimensions to have a higher exploratory power, although 
Schwartz’s model seemed to be more internally consistent. 
The fifth wave of the WVS (see the note of Figure 3 for the included 
nations) includes both measures of Schwartz’s value circle (Table 2) and the 
indicators for Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) dimensions (Table 3). Both Study I 
and Study II aimed to answer the research question of how the two value 
theories by Schwartz and Inglehart relate both at the individual and cultural 
levels, using two different analytical strategies. By rotating the value structures 
towards one other, Study I aimed to highlight their conceptual similarities and, 
at the same time, to maximize their correlations. Such rotation is possible 
because the orientation of orthogonal axes in a 2-dimensional space is arbitrary. 
Study II was designed to find the substantive associations between Schwartz’s 
and Inglehart’s items that have remained undiscovered by earlier comparisons 
and to identify the value content which is not covered by the respective other 
value theory. This was done by analyzing their items jointly by means of a 
multi-dimensional scaling technic, which allows visualization of similarities or 
dissimilarities in a correlation matrix of all 20 variables. 
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3.1. Maximizing the overlap between Inglehart’s and  
Schwartz’s value dimensions: A rotational approach 
In Study I we first reproduced the originally proposed dimensions of both value 
theories (see Tables 1 and 3; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 1992; 1994). 
In a second step, we rotated Inglehart’s dimensions towards Schwartz’s value 
circle.  
After Inglehart’s dimensions had been rotated 27 degrees clockwise at the 
cultural level, Autonomy vs. Embeddedness showed a maximal overlap with 
Inglehart’s Self-Expression vs. Survival dimension, r = .82 (p < .001). With this 
method, however, it was not possible to increase the associations 
simultaneously for the second pair of dimensions – Egalitarianism-Harmony vs. 
Hierarchy-Mastery and Secular-Rational vs. Traditional values – which 
correlated before and after rotation near zero. 
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Figure 3. Plot of countries on the (a) Inglehart’s and (b) Schwartz’s 2-dimensional 
maps.  
 
Note. Please note the different scaling of the x-axis: In Schwartz’s figure (a), Autonomy is located 
on the left but in Inglehart’s figure (b), Self-Expression is indicated on the right in order to be 
comparable with earlier publications of these two authors (e.g., Schwartz, 2006; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). Respective N with complete answers in brackets. AD = Andorra (901); AR = 
Argentina (642); AU = Australia (1257); BF = Burkina Faso (859); BG = Bulgaria (503); BR = 
Brazil (1305); CA = Canada (1701); CL = Chile (790); CN = China (937); CSS = Serbia (549); 
CY = Cyprus (990); DEE = East Germany (839); DEW = West Germany (627); ES = Spain (926); 
ET = Ethiopia (849); FI = Finland (878); FR = France (897); GB = Great Britain (734); GE = 
Georgia (1020); GH = Ghana (1299); ID = Indonesia (1323); IN = India (909); JP = Japan (582); 
JO = Jordan (1085); KR = South Korea (1174); ML = Mali (607); MO = Moldova (846); MX = 
Mexico (1304); MY = Malaysia (1178); NL = Netherlands (798); NO = Norway (936); PL = 
Poland (687); RO = Romania (1135); RU = Russian Federation (1091); RW = Rwanda (1146); SE 
= Sweden (807); SI = Slovenia (710); TH = Thailand (1431); TR = Turkey (1104); TT = Trinidad 
and Tobago (921); TW = Taiwan (1200); UA = Ukraine (555); US = United States (1118); UY = 
Uruguay (659); VN = Vietnam (1111); ZA = South Africa (2504); ZM = Zambia (1026).  
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The following is to illustrate the adjustment of Inglehart’s dimensions in order 
to maximize the fit between the two sets of value dimensions. Before rotation, 
Norway and Sweden were located high on the Self-Expression (x-axis) and at 
the same time high on the Secular-Rational (y-axis) value dimensions in the 
upper-right corner of the Cultural Map of the World (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
With the rotation, these nations moved closer to the midpoint of the y-axis while 
keeping their leading position on the x-axis (Figure 3a). As can be seen from the 
2-dimensional plots, after rotation, the locations of the nations on Inglehart’s 
and Schwartz’s value maps (Figure 3b) were similar along the x-axis (e.g., 
Sweden and Romania), but not necessarily along the y-axis (e.g., Brazil and 
Japan).  
The results suggest that Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s originally proposed  
2-dimensional value structures share one dimension at the cultural level, 
whereas the other-pair of dimensions seem to be much less related than 
previously found (e.g., Schwartz, 2006). It is noteworthy that Schwartz’s (2006) 
earlier comparison indicated an overlap of Autonomy vs. Embeddedness and 
Self-Expression vs. Survival values of only 41 %, whereas the 67% overlap we 
observed in the correlation at the country level is evidence of high similarity.  
At the individual level, the rotation of Inglehart’s values of about 45 degrees 
clockwise produced two dimensions with totally new content at the diagonals of 
his model, which were coined Secular-Rational/Survival and Secular-
Rational/Self-Expression, according to the poles the new dimensions cut in half. 
At this level, the maximal overlap between Schwartz’s Openness to Change vs. 
Conservation dimension and Inglehart’s Secular-Rational/Self-Expression 
diagonal was r = . 24 (p < .001). Given the reported differences in prediction 
power (see Beckers et al., 2012; Datler et al., 2012), this overlap of merely 6% 
has the implication that it makes sense to ‘keep’ both theories, as they tap into 
different concepts. Furthermore, the associations between the Schwartz’s Self-
Transcendence vs. Self-Enhancement and both Inglehart’s dimensions were 
relatively weak (see also Welzel, 2010). 
 
 
3.2. Analyzing Inglehart’s and  
Schwartz’s items in a joint value space 
Study II focused on relationships between Inglehart’s and Schwartz’s theories 
that can be found at the level of single items. To make this comparison possible, 
we controlled for biases in scale use with a covariate correction approach 
simultaneously in both value measures using the mean rating given to all 
Schwartz items (Schwartz, 2005) and an index of communication styles based 
on selected WVS items. The latter adjustment variable was suggested by Smith 
(2011). 
The results indicated that, at the country level, those items belonging to 
Schwartz’s Autonomy vs. Embeddedness dimension were located at the 
7
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diagonal of the Cultural Map of the World (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), 
suggesting that, in order to be autonomous, individuals need to have both self-
expressive and secular-rational values, whereas being embedded means 
endorsing both traditional and survival values. 
Recently, Vauclair and colleagues (2011) located a new cultural value type, 
Self-Fulfilled Connectedness, which contains values that represent profound 
attachment to others as well as attributes of self-fulfillment. The reported 
similarities in meaning of Self-Expression and Intellectual Autonomy, which in 
Study II merged in the joint value space, support the notion that autonomous 
human choice has a social connotation.  
At the individual level, there was a similarity between Inglehart’s Self-
Expression and only one Schwartz’s item measuring Self-Direction. Inglehart’s 
Secular-Rational and Traditional value items were found to go together with the 
items measuring Schwartz’s Openness to Change vs. Conservation dimension. 
Overall, however, Inglehart’s items lay along a single axis within Schwartz’s 
value circle which started between Stimulation and Self-Direction and ended 
close to the Security and Tradition items, suggesting that it takes endorsement 
of values captured by both Inglehart dimensions in order to be truly open or 
conservative, respectively.  
Nonetheless, two distinct regions of Schwartz’s values were identified in 
which none of the Inglehart’s items were located: Harmony–Egalitarianism vs. 
Hierarchy–Mastery (cultural level) and Self-Transcendence vs. Self-
Enhancement (individual level), respectively. At the same time, the joint MDS 
plot revealed that, at the individual level, Inglehart’s Survival values are not 
captured by the Schwartz’s items included. This finding is in line with Fischer 
and colleagues (2011), who argued that values related to survival needs are 
largely absent in Schwartz’s value inventories. 
The identification of unique value content of both theories is maybe the most 
important contribution of Study II. We were also able to confirm, to some 
extent, recent attempts at the theoretical development of Schwartz’s values 
(Vauclair et al., 2011) and also Fischer and colleagues’ (2011) criticism. 
 
 
4. Human life course:  
Disentangling age, period, and cohort effects  
When interested in changes of psychological variables across the life-span, 
researchers are confronted with complex methodological issues associated with 
the simultaneous estimation of age, period, and cohort effects (APC). These 
three components of change were defined as follows (Study III): Age effects 
are effects of growing older (for instance, climbing stairs is easier for a young 
than for a very old person; role changes like those associated with becoming 
parents, etc.). Period effects are societal, historical, or cultural changes 
simultaneously influencing all cohorts. Cohort effects are “the replacement of 
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(happier or less happier) cohorts born early in the 20th century by cohorts born 
later in the same century” (p. 298). 
By aiming to examine cultural differences in change trajectories, we used an 
alternative to longitudinal studies, which is an intra-cohort aging approach to 
change, also called a cross-sectional sequential design (Baltes, 1968; Glenn, 
2005). “Intra-cohort aging summarizes the net results of individual-level change 
and is, therefore, a conservative aggregate measure of what is happening at the 
individual level” (Danigelis, Hardy, & Cutler, 2007, p. 813). This approach is 
based on the basic claim that members of a birth cohort share special 
characteristic features due to the unique socio-historical experiences they had in 
their formative years (i.e., during socialization) (e.g., Ryder, 1965). The design 
makes it possible, by building on an age by cohort table, to follow birth cohorts 
as they grow older in order to disentangle effects of aging from period and 
cohort effects. The interaction effects of age or cohort and time of measurement 
(i.e., period), however, must be examined in separate analyses due to an 
identification problem (Mason, Oppenheim, Mason, & Winsborough, 1973).  
Methodologically, the identification problem is a multicollinarity situation 
due to the fact that if one has the age of a respondent and the period when the 
survey took place, the third variable, namely, year of birth, can be perfectly 
calculated. For this statistical reason, it was believed until recently that 
confounded APC effects could not be estimated within a single statistical model 
(Glenn, 2005) without imposing one or more constraints (e.g., by constraining 
the coefficients of two periods to be equal). The results, however, will always 
depend on the constraints used and there is no empirical test that can give 
certainty whether the right ones were chosen (Tu, Davey Smith, & Gilthorpe, 
2011). Thus, although several empirical approaches have been proposed in 
order to overcome or at least avoid the identification problem (e.g., Mishler & 
Rose, 2007; Tu et al., 2011; Yang, Fu, & Land, 2004; Yang & Land, 2006), all 
these new APC approaches “have primarily been employed by their authors and 
have yet to be widely adopted or evaluated by other researchers or 
methodologists” (Harding, 2009, p. 1451) or “cannot or should not be used to 
recover the underlying age, period, and cohort effects” (Luo, in press, p. 1). For 
these reasons, a graphical cross-sectional sequential design was used in Study 
III, which looks at interactions between two of the three APC components at a 
time. 
 
4.1. Cultural differences in the relationship between age  
and subjective well-being 
People’s well-being across life span has caught the interest not only of 
psychologists but also of demographers and economists (Easterlin, 2006). 
Related studies examine special populations like the elderly (e.g., Gana, Bailly, 
Saada, Joulain, & Alaphilippe, 2012), investigate changes in satisfaction over 
the life circle of parenthood (Powdthavee, 2009), look at gender differences 
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(Inglehart, 2002), or focus on the depriving effect of youth unemployment on 
their life satisfaction (Realo & Dobewall, 2011). Most importantly, there is an 
ongoing debate of whether SWB is U-shaped in life (Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2008; 2009; Glenn, 2009; Sutin, Terracciano, Milaneschi, An, Ferrucci, & 
Zonderman, 2013; Yang, 2008) – that people in midlife would be generally less 
happy than those at younger and older ages – and about the degree to which this 
trend can be generalized cross-culturally (Baird, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2010; 
Deaton, 2008). If SWB does indeed have a universal age trajectory, it would 
have wide-ranging implications for policymakers and scientists in a world of 
aging societies (United Nations, 2010), whilst a rejection of this claim would be 
even more important to take into account when making culture-sensitive 
predictions of societal development on these measures.  
Study III was carried out in order to compare the relationship between age 
and life satisfaction in four European nations: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and 
Sweden. The age representative sequential (repeated) cross-sectional dataset 
was produced by merging EVS, WVS, and ESS. This way it was possible to 
investigate changes over a period of up to 27 years. The study makes an 
important contribution to the literature because studies at one specific point in 
time alone cannot explain why age-life satisfaction trajectories differ across 
countries (cf. Deaton, 2008). 
The mean levels of life satisfaction in the two Nordic nations showed an 
almost flat trend, whilst in the Baltic countries they varied considerably. Like 
earlier research (Diener & Oishi, 2004; Inglehart et al., 2008; Veenhoven, 1996; 
White, 2007), we observed consistent mean level differences between Estonia-
Latvia and Finland-Sweden. More specifically, in the Nordic nations there was a 
flat trend, at a comparatively high level. In the Baltic countries the mean levels 
of life satisfaction varied considerably – decreasing from 1990 to 1996, then 
steadily increasing until 2006/2007 and finally again slightly decreasing 
(2008/2009) – driven by immense political and socioeconomic changes in these 
nations during the last two decades (Inglehart et al., 2008). Even today, people 
in Estonia and Latvia report, on average, two scale points lower life satisfaction 
than their neighbors in Finland and Sweden. 
In the two Nordic countries, the relationship between age and life 
satisfaction was virtually zero. Unlike in Finland and Sweden, the relationship 
between age and subjective well-being in Estonia and Latvia was best described 
as curvilinear, with younger and older people having higher levels of life 
satisfaction. Study III also found – in line with many other studies (see George, 
2010, for a review) – little evidence for declining life satisfaction in old age. 
If the observed relationship between age and life satisfaction did indeed 
appear primarily due to age effects, there should be a universal age-related 
intra-cohort change, whereas the between-cohort mean level differences in 
SWB should be minor. Our findings, however, showed that the observed 
changes in life satisfaction across the life-span in Estonia and Latvia were not 
due to age-related changes per se but rather to an interaction of cohort (e.g., the 
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later born cohorts having high social optimism and no Soviet-time memories) 
and period effects (e.g., the improved economic situation).  
Putting the results into the big picture, Study III serves as an example for 
the same historical event (such as the restoration of independence in Estonia 
and Latvia) resulting in different outcomes for different cohorts experiencing 
the same event but at different life stages (the “losers” vs. the “winners” of 
transition). This is alarming, because the current economic crisis, and, in 
particular, recently high youth unemployment in Europe, has the potential to 
produce a “lost generation” with permanently lower mean SWB levels than 
earlier born cohorts (Realo & Dobewall, 2011; Sutin et al., 2013). In such a 
situation, within-nation trajectories of well-being across age may change if an 
historical event exerts a lasting effect on (young) people’s well-being.  
 
 
5. Self-other agreement in values and well-being 
Survey researchers are confronted with the subjectivity of the answers provided 
by their respondents and the inherent limits of self-report methodology. It is 
well known that people’s reports of their behavior, attitudes, personality, and 
well-being may be affected by various response biases such as socially desirable 
responding (Paulhus, 1991) or the tendency to present oneself in a more positive 
light than is warranted by the facts (Diener et al., 2003). How do we know, then, 
if a person truly has traditional or universalistic values, or is in fact happy or 
satisfied? One possibility is to collect data through an independent measurement 
method, using opinions of other people (e.g., peers, spouses, siblings, parents 
etc.) who know the person well. 
In this context, an examination of the self-other agreement (i.e., the 
correlation between self- and other-reports) has a remarkable history of 
providing a consensual validation of self-report measures in the fields of 
happiness (Hartmann, 1934), personality traits (Cattell, 1946), and other 
individual attributes. The other-ratings can be compared to respective self-
ratings in order to validate the self-report measure of life satisfaction, happiness, 
or value priorities. If there is no convergence, then the measures used may not 
capture the underlying concept of interest. However, a more modest 
interpretation of observed correlations may also be reasonable because it might 
well be that they both measure something completely different. 
Today meta-analyses are available for both SWB (Schneider & Schimmack, 
2009) and personality traits (Connolly, Kavanagh, & Viswesvaran, 2007), 
yielding a substantial effect size for self-other agreement in these psychological 
constructs. For personal values, however, this test still has to be made, even 
though research in human values has a comparably long tradition (Allport & 
Vernon, 1931). For SWB, research has already begun to identify sources of the 
observed agreement between observer- and self-report measures (Schneider, & 
Schimmack, 2010; Schneider, Schimmack, Petrican, & Walker, 2010). There-
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fore, there is a remarkable difference in terms of the state of research between 
the two concepts.  
Two separate studies were designed in order to examine self-other agreement 
of happiness and life satisfaction (Study IV), and personal values (Study V), 
both in relation to personality traits. 
 
 
5.1. The role of personality traits  
in the self-other agreement in SWB 
When assessing the self-other agreement of happiness and life satisfaction, it is 
important to note that demographic variables, compared to dispositional 
personality traits, explain only a relatively small part of the variance in SWB 
scales (Diener et al. 1999). As argued above, Extraversion and Neuroticism are 
strongly correlated with SWB and there is some consensus that positive affect 
even forms the core of Extraversion (Watson & Clark 1997). Consequently, one 
could expect that personality traits also serve as an important basis for self- and 
other-ratings of SWB.  
The dataset included single item measures for both essential components of 
SWB (cf. Diener et al., 2003) – happiness and life satisfaction – which were 
combined in a composite score of individual differences in well-being. In this 
study, we concentrated on the 30 personality trait facet scores of the NEO-PI-3 
(McCrae, Costa, & Martin, 2005). 
Preliminary analyses showed, in line with DeNeve and Cooper’s (1998) 
meta-analysis, that also more narrow traits – in the form of personality facets – 
correlate with well-being. Moreover, it was found that both other-ratings and 
self-reports of SWB were predicted by self- and other-rated personality facets. 
The main purpose of Study IV was to examine the role of personality traits 
in the self-other agreement in subjective well-being. We proposed two different 
paths: the one derived from the concept of the looking-glass-self (Cooley, 1902) 
the other drawing on lay beliefs of causes of people’s happiness (Furnham & 
Cheng, 2000). The first perspective assumes that other-views of personality and, 
likewise, SWB reflect onto a person’s self-reports of SWB. In other words, it 
assumes that self-reported SWB is partially determined by other-ratings of 
SWB, and that the effect of other-ratings on self-ratings is transmitted by 
specific self- and other-personality traits. The second perspective is based on the 
idea that lay people know about the special role of personality in life 
evaluations. Therefore, it is also possible that, when judging someone’s SWB, 
knowledgeable informants indeed base their ratings on the targets’ self-reported 
SWB. In this case, self-reported SWB accounts for other-reported SWB, 
although the effect is likely to be mediated by certain self- and other-rated 
personality traits.  
The measure of SWB showed significant and comparatively high self-other 
agreement, r = .55 (p = .000). Using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) multiple 
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mediator model, we found this agreement to be mediated through the self- and 
other-rated personality facet scores of N3 (Depression) and E6 (Positive 
Emotions), Z = 2.8001–11.7142. This finding implies that people recognize if 
someone we know well is happy or unhappy, satisfied or unsatisfied, based also 
on specific personality facets of the target. At the same time, self-reported SWB 
may reflect, to some extent, what other people think about one’s personality. 
 
 
5.2. Convergence between self-report and other-report 
measures of personal values in comparison to personality traits 
It has been argued by several researchers that personal values might be too 
privately held (McAdams, 1995) or too individually subjective (Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004) to be accurately judged by others.  
Study V was conducted in order to examine whether the self-other 
agreement in personal values is at a comparable level with another aspect of a 
person’s personality: traits. If the convergence among these self- and other-
report measures of values is at a substantial level (i.e., at least at the same level 
as that of the Big Five domains), it would suggest that observers can judge 
others’ personal values with some accuracy.  
As said above, the study is a novel attempt at systematically examining and 
interpreting the self-other agreement in personal values. There are two opposing 
views of whether values or traits are expected to show higher self-other 
agreement. The Five-Factor Theory (McCrae & Costa, 1999) of personality 
classifies values as so-called characteristic adaptations – formed through the 
interaction of personality traits with the environment – which can be better 
assessed by direct observation than basic personality traits (Allik & McCrae, 
2002). The theory of human values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992), on the 
contrary, “suggest[s] that it is difficult for others to infer a person’s values 
because a value may be expressed in a variety of behaviours and any single 
behaviour may express multiple values. Moreover, values refer to motivation 
not to action, so observers must infer them indirectly” (Study V, p. 3), resulting 
in less convergence between self-reports and other-ratings of values as 
compared to personality traits.  
We used two different value measures in order to capture both more general 
higher-order values and specific value types. As described above, the Schwartz 
value measure included (the ESS PVQ) has relatively low reliabilities 
(Schwartz, 2007) compared to the Big Five personality traits of the S5 (see 
Konstabel et al., 2012). Also, the second, culture-specific value measure – the 
EVI – has shown differences in internal consistencies (Aavik & Allik, 2002). 
This indicates that the differences in the proportion of error in the values and 
trait measurements should be taken into account when relating the level of their 
self-other agreement (Schmidt & Hunter, 1996).  
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When corrected for attenuation (i.e., measurement error), the self-other 
agreement in the higher-order values (median r = .65) was very similar to that 
of the basic personality traits (median r = .68). Substantial self-other agreement 
correlations (median r = .68) were also found for the six lower-level value types 
of the EVI.  
These findings suggest that other-ratings can be used for examining people’s 
values, as the correlations between self- and other-ratings of values are at the 
same level as for well-being (Study IV) or personality traits (Schneider & 
Schimmack, 2009). Other-reports of values should therefore be used more often 
to complement self-ratings. 
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CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
To sum up, the main conclusions of this dissertation are the following: 
 The value theories proposed by Shalom Schwartz and Ronald Inglehart share 
one dimension (67% overlap), which seems to coincide with what is best 
known as the opposition between individualism and collectivism (Study I). 
An analysis of the joint structure of Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s items (Study 
II) showed that in order to be autonomous, individuals need to have both 
self-expressive and secular-rational values, whereas being embedded means 
endorsing both traditional and survival values. We also found unique content 
of both Schwartz’s and Inglehart’s values not captured by the other 
respective theory, suggesting that researchers should continue to use them 
both. 
 Are there cross-cultural differences in life-span trajectories of life 
satisfaction? We found in Finland and Sweden that age does not seem to 
matter much for how satisfied people are, whilst the relationship between 
age and life satisfaction in Estonia and Latvia was best described as 
curvilinear, with life satisfaction reaching its lowest level at around 51–60 
years of age. At the same time, younger people were remarkably more 
satisfied than older people (Study III). The observed age differences in life 
satisfaction in the two Baltic countries seem to be best attributed to an 
interaction of cohort and period effects. Thus, a universal life satisfaction 
age trajectory may not exist; the relationship between age and life 
satisfaction is likely to vary along with important cultural, political, and 
socioeconomic factors. 
 Study IV reported a strong self-other agreement in subjective well-being 
(SWB). Self- and other-rated personality facet scores (N3: Depression and 
E6: Positive Emotions) were found to partially mediate the agreement 
between self- and other-rated SWB. The findings suggest that, when making 
judgments about someone’ happiness or life satisfaction, observers indeed 
rely on the personality traits of this person. Moreover, we found that self-
reported SWB reflects, to some extent, what other people think about this 
person’s personality. 
 Finally, Study V compared the self-other agreement in personal values 
versus the Big Five personality traits. When corrected for attenuation due to 
measurement error, self-other agreement in both the higher-order values and 
more narrowly defined value factors was substantial and similar to that for 
the Big Five personality traits. The results of Study V suggest that people 
can judge others’ values with some accuracy and therefore other-ratings of 
personal values can be used to validate and complement self-report value 
measures.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Väärtused ja subjektiivne heaolu: individuaalsete ja  
kultuuriliste erinevuste, elu jooksul toimuvate muutuste ning  
enda ja teiste hinnangute kokkulangevuse uurimus 
Väärtused juhivad ja õigustavad inimeste tegevust, peegeldades samal ajal 
kultuuri ideaale ja jagatud arusaamu sellest, mis on õige ja vale, hea või halb. 
Käesoleva väitekirja on eesmärgiks välja selgitada, kas ja kuivõrd kattuvad 
Shalom Schwartzi ja Ronald Ingleharti väärtusteooriad, ehk millised on nende 
poolt välja pakutud väärtusmõõtmete ühised ja unikaalsed omadused (Uurimus 
I ja II). Teiseks oluliseks teemaks, mida antud väitekiri käsitleb, on inimeste 
subjektiivne heaolu, mille all peetakse silmas inimeste hinnanguid oma 
õnnnelikkusele ja eluga rahulolule. Väitekirja eesmärk on siinkohal eristada 
vanuse, ajastu ja sünnikohordi mõju eluga rahulolu vanuselistes muutustes 
(Uurimus III), sooviga seletada eluga rahulolu ealisi muutusi erinevates 
kultuurides. Samuti käsitleb väitekiri enda ja teiste hinnangute kokkulangevust 
nii subjektiivse heaolu (Uurimus IV) kui väärtuste puhul (Uurimus V), võttes 
sealjuures arvesse ka peamiste isiksuse seadumuste vahendava mõju. 
Väitekirja peamised tulemused ja järeldused on järgmised: 
 Shalom Schwartzi ja Ronald Ingleharti väärtusteooriad kattuvad suures 
osas vaid ühe kultuuritasandi väärtusmõõtme lõikes, mis väljendab 
ühiskondade individualistlikke ja kollektivistlikke püüdlusi (Uurimus I). 
Schwartzi ja Ingleharti väärtusdimensioonide aluseks olevate üksik-
küsimuste analüüs näitas, et selleks, et olla oma väärtushinnangutes auto-
noomne ja avatud, peavad indiviidid pidama oluliseks nii eneseväljendus-
likke kui ka ilmalik-ratsionaalseid väärtuseid, samas kui konservatiivsuse 
ja seotusega käib kaasas nii traditsionaalsete kui ellujäämist rõhutavate 
väärtuste oluliseks pidamine (Uurimus II). Ühtlasi leidsime, et nii 
Schwartzi kui Ingleharti väärtusmõõtmetel on teatav unikaalne sisu, mis-
tõttu oleks uurijatel mõistlik jätkata mõlema väärtusteooria kasutamist. 
 Kas eluga rahulolu muutused eluea lõikes on kõikjal samasugused? 
Leidsime, et Soomes ja Rootsis ei sõltu inimeste eluga rahulolu kuigivõrd 
sellest, milline on nende vanus, samal ajal kui Eestis ja Lätis on eluga 
rahulolu kõver elukäigu jooksul kergelt U-kujuline (Uurimus III). Eluga 
rahulolu Eestis ja Lätis on kõrgeim noorte inimeste seas; kuni ligikaudu 
60. eluaastani eluga rahulolu pidevalt langeb, jäädes seejärel püsima 
samale tasemele (Läti) või hakates vähesel määral taas tõusma (Eesti). 
Uurimus III tulemused näitavad, et eluga rahulolu vanuselised muutused 
kahes eelnimetatud Balti riigis on ennekõike tingitud sünnikohordi ja 
ajastu koosmõjust. Seega, universaalset eluga rahulolu trajektoori ei ole 
olemas – eluga rahulolu muutused inimeste eluea lõikes võivad eri 
riikides märkimisväärselt varieeruda, sõltudes olulistest kultuurilistest, 
poliitilistest ja sotsiaalmajanduslikest teguritest. 
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 Uurimus IV käsitles enda ja teiste antud hinnangute kokkulangevust 
subjektiivse heaolu hindamisel. Tulemused näitasid, et nii enda kui teiste 
poolt antud hinnangud inimese isiksuse seadumustele (N3: Depressioon 
ja E6: Positiivsed emotsioonid) vahendavad osaliselt enda ja teiste 
hinnangute kokkulangevust subjektiivse heaolu puhul. Ehk siis viitavad 
Uurimus IV tulemused sellele, et hinnates kellegi teise õnnelikkust või 
eluga rahulolu, toetuvad inimesed hinnangute andmisel vähemasti 
osaliselt hinnatava inimese isiksuse seadumustele. Samuti leidsime, et see 
enesekohased subjektiivse heaolu hinnangud võivad teatud määral 
peegeldada seda, kuidas teised inimesed antud inimese isiksust näevad ja 
hindavad. 
 Lõpetuseks, Uurimus V võrdles enda ja teise hinnangute kokkulangevust 
väärtuste ja Suure Viisiku isiksuse seadumuste puhul. Tulemused näita-
sid, et kui võtta arvesse mõõtmisviga, on enda ja teiste hinnangute kokku-
langevus väärtuste puhul isiksuse seadumustega võrreldaval tasemel. 
Seega võib Uurimus V tulemuste põhjal väita, et inimesed suudavad 
teiste inimeste väärtusi küllaltki täpselt hinnata, mistõttu saab teiste poolt 
antud hinnanguid edukalt kasutada enesekohaste väärtushinnangute 
valideerimiseks ja täiendamiseks. 
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